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Abstract—The notion of Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA)
refers to inter-connected pieces of avionics equipment supported
by a wired technology, with stringent reliability and safety
requirements. If the inter-connecting wires are physically secured
so that a malicious user cannot access them directly, then this
enforces (at least partially) the security of the network. However,
substituting the wired network with a wireless network - which
in this context is referred to as an Avionics Wireless Network
(AWN) - brings a number of new challenges related to assurance,
reliability, and security. The AWN thus has to ensure that it
provides at least the required security and safety levels offered
by the equivalent wired network. Providing a wired-equivalent
security for a communication channel requires the setting up of
a strong, secure (encrypted) channel between the entities that
are connected to the AWN. In this paper, we propose three
approaches to establish such a secure channel based on (i) pre-
shared keys, (ii) trusted key distribution, and (iii) key-sharing
protocols. For each of these approaches, we present at least
two representative protocol variants. These protocols are then
implemented as part of a demo AWN and they are then compared
based on performance measurements. Most importantly, we have
evaluated these protocols based on security and operational
requirements that we define in this paper for an AWN.
I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s aircraft, Aircraft Data Networks (ADNs) –
highly reliable, efficient and fault-tolerant distributed (real-
time) networks – interconnect a large number of avionics sub-
systems, enabling data and network management commands
(control messages) to be exchanged within a predefined and
deterministic time frame. These ADNs have to cater for a
number of sub-systems with both critical and non-critical func-
tions. Building a network that efficiently manages these two
functions, while still providing a fully deterministic network
with guaranteed bandwidth and Quality of Service (QoS), is
extremely challenging [1].
These ADNs are basically wired networks that connect
multiple devices using a physical connection. Examples of
such networks include ARINC 825 [2], ARINC 664/AFDX
(Avionics Full DupleX Switched Ethernet) [3, 4] and standard
Ethernet. The wiring of these network cables requires an
extensive design-time configuration of the aircraft, making
post adaptation less flexible, not to mention the potential of
wires being eroded and the problem of additional weight. In
addition, the network redundancy is based on dissimilar paths,
not dissimilar mediums of communication, even though the
latter is known to be a better solution.
For these reasons, potentially, for non-critical functions of
an aircraft a wired link between two communication points
can be replaced with a wireless communication medium. Such
a network is referred to as an Avionics Wireless Network
(AWN). The potential for wireless communication in the AWN
to be eavesdropped and/or modified is comparatively higher
than for an ADN. For this reason, all communication between
wireless nodes (pieces of equipment) in an AWN should
be encrypted. To achieve such secure communication (via
encryption), AWN nodes have to establish secure channels
between each other, by running a secure channel protocol.
In this paper, we have selected seven such secure channel
protocols based on three different wireless communication
deployment approaches. These selected protocols are then
analysed for their suitability from performance and security
point of view for AWN deployment.
A. Contribution
In this paper, our main focus is on the security and per-
formance analysis of different secure channel protocols for
AWNs. Our salient contributions are the following:
1) selection of seven secure channel protocols based on three
different setup approaches (pre-shared keys, trusted key
distribution, and key sharing protocols);
2) definition of criteria to compare these secure channel
protocols along with the related security and performance
analysis;
3) implementation of these protocols in a AWN test-bed
based on off-the-shelve hardware, so as to be able to make
measurements.
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B. Structure of the Paper
Section II briefly presents the generic architecture of Air-
craft Data Networks, which constitutes a rationale for con-
sidering the benefits of using Wireless Networks. Section III
discusses different AWN formats and the need for secure
channel protocols and proposes a case study in which the
secure channel protocols presented in section V may take
place. Section IV introduces the studied secure channel de-
ployment scenarios. Section V provides the results of the
evaluation of several secure channel protocols in a AWN test-
bed. Section VI compares them based on the obtained results
according to the defined security and performance criteria. In
section VII we provide a summary of our experiments.
II. AIRCRAFT DATA NETWORKS
In this section, we discuss the traditional deployment of
a wired network (ADN) in an aircraft. We conclude with a
short list of benefits that would result from replacing some
non-critical functions of ADN with wireless technology.
A. Generic Architecture
A modern aircraft network consists of several data networks,
including flight-control and/or crew network (figure 1), and
passengers (entertainment) network (figure 2).
Flight-control and/or crew networks consist of a multitude
of sub-systems interconnected using wired technology as
shown in figure 1. These different avionics sub-systems are
connected with end systems that are then interconnected by
means of a backbone network using several communication
standards like ARINC 429 [5], ARINC 825 [2] or AFDX
(ARINC 664 Aircraft Data Network, Part 7) [3, 6]. Each arrow
in the figure 1 represents a logical communication link that
physically consists of two wires connecting these devices via
different paths (dissimilar path redundancy).
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Figure 1. Generic Aircraft (Flight-Control and/or Crew) Data Network with
AFDX as an Example
For some specific sub-systems, there are sets of sensors and
actuators connected on Controller Area Network (CAN) [7] or
ARINC 429 buses for flight control systems [8]. The AFDX or
a similar technology is used to interconnect time- and safety-
critical sub-systems like environmental control, doors and
other utility systems. The AFDX backbone also connects less
critical sub-systems like displays providing safety information
to passengers, but includes oxygen masks, oxygen flow and
audio announcement triggers, and it manages the quality of
service accordingly.
As shown in figure 2, the entertainment network can be
supported using standard Ethernet technology – it is not a
high reliability- and safety-critical network.
Cabin Management
Content Server
Cabin Surveillance
Passenger Information / In-seat 
Entertainment
Ethernet
Figure 2. Generic Aircraft (Cabin) Data Network
The type and nature of the network configuration is de-
pendent on the deployment scenario and objectives. However,
there is a possibility that the flight control network, crew net-
work and passenger (entertainment) network are all supported
by the same wired technology, requiring implementation of
network segregation by either physical separation of networks
or by stringent firewalls, robust gateways and security policies
[9].
B. Benefits of Wireless Networks
Whatever the network deployment topology and the com-
munication technology used, one common element remains:
the physical wire that connects two or more avionics sub-
systems. Wiring an aircraft can be costly in that it includes
wiring harness designs, cable fabrication and the associated
exploitation cost due to the resulting additional weight. Fur-
thermore, to provide dual redundancy these wires have to
connect any two devices via two physically separated paths in
the aircraft. Potentially, the wires and the related connectors
represent 2-5 percent of an aircraft’s weight [10]. The design
of the wiring route is heavily dependent on wiring harness
design that has to satisfy the challenge of providing separate
routing paths for redundant wiring. As the wiring of an
aircraft is a time- and labor-intensive activity, post-deployment
upgrades or installation of new wire routes or avionics sub-
systems can be very expensive [11]. As reported by [10],
roughly 30 percent of wires are potential candidates for
wireless substitutes. Therefore, as highlighted in [12], wireless
solutions have reasonable prospects as long as security, safety
and high levels of reliability can be maintained.
III. AVIONICS WIRELESS NETWORK
Referring to [12], an AWN is defined as an aircraft net-
work inter-connecting its different components using wireless
technology instead of physical wires. Based on this definition,
AWNs have been classified into four overlapping deployment
architectures [12]:
1) Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN): A WSN is a set
of intelligent and autonomous systems that can sense
physical or environmental conditions and/or act on them.
Usually WSN nodes record the designated data and
transfer them via a wireless medium to some dedicated
nodes (so-called sinks) that act as gateways (as in a
wireless mesh network) between the WSN and a third
party system, to which the connection can be wired. As
some related work has mentioned, such networks are
particularly useful in aircraft design [13, 14], especially
to monitor moving and/or rotating parts (for example,
the landing gear [10] or the engine itself [15]). A
WSN can also be useful as an independent network (i.e.
not connected to the aircraft network) simply to collect
and store flight-related data; for instance, to improve the
efficiency of an on-ground maintenance crew [16].
2) Dissimilar Redundancy Network (DRN): Since aircraft
networks must be fault-tolerant, wireless links can be
used to build dissimilar redundant networks; this would
lower the probability of a potential common mode failure
in networks based on the same wired technology. In
addition, it decreases the difficulty of routing the wires
- as much as possible, and as permitted by the aircraft
geometry - using physically disjoint paths. Related work
has identified that dissimilar network technologies can
provide redundancy, which might enhance the overall
reliability [17] in some critical situations compared to
“identical redundancy” [18].
3) Inflight Entertainment Network (IFE): Since it is one
of the least critical networks on board an aircraft, the
Ethernet switch of the IFE depicted in figure 2 can be
replaced by a wireless access point as described by [19],
to offer more custom services without decreasing the
overall safety of the aircraft.
4) Wireless as a Comm-Link: In this type of AWN, wire-
less communication links replace the wired links between
avionics computing modules as shown in Figure 3. The
protocols and the network architecture above the data link
layer can remain the same, but at the physical layer, the
data is communicated via a wireless medium rather than
a wired medium. This type of network can be considered
as a partial or a full deployment. In a partial deployment,
out of two redundant wired links between aircraft sub-
systems only one is replaced by a wireless link. In a full
deployment both wired links between the aircraft sub-
systems are replaced by wireless links.
A. Related Work on Security Concerns
Security and trust have also been subject to analysis by both
the academic community and the industry. A brief overview
of aircraft information security and some improvements were
proposed in [16]. Security assurance research, from airplane
production up to operation, was presented in [20, 21]. A
general discussion on the security issues related to the aircraft
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Figure 3. Generic Representation of Wireless as a Comm-Link
network and aircrafts’ internet connectivity is discussed in
[22], while [1, 9] discuss the impact of WSNs deployed in
aircraft and related security concerns. Security and safety are
intrinsically related to each other in general and especially in
the context of the aviation industry [23]–[25]. The application
and impact of cryptography, and especially the impact of
public key cryptography for avionics networks, was evaluated
in [26].
Security and the general deployment of AWNs based on
wireless-as-a-comm-link have been analyzed in [12], which
discusses the security and trust challenges faced by AWNs.
Beside this, a crucial component of the security of aircraft
devices is the trusted boot process discussed in [27]. The
security, trust and assurance issues related to bringing a user
device into an aircraft network are evaluated in [28].
B. AWN Case Study
When considering the four deployment models discussed
above for a wireless technology as part of an aircraft network,
one thing is common: all of these options rely on data being
transmitted over the air. This potentially makes it easier for an
adversary to eavesdrop and/or modify the transmitted pieces
of information. To prevent such eventualities, strong cryp-
tography constructs are deployed to create a secure channel.
A secure communication channel is encrypted with a key
known only by the communicating entities. From an attacker’s
perspective he/she can still observe the encrypted messages
but these should not give him/her any knowledge about the
contents of the communication. Regarding the modification
of messages, an attacker can modify them but the results
(decrypted form of the transmitted message) would potentially
not be in his/her control – because he/she does not know the
key used to encrypt the message. However, if a strong integrity
mechanism is used to secure the channel, any modification
would be detected.
Having secure channels for AWN communication is essen-
tial. To achieve this, an AWN has to run a secure channel
protocol that would result in communicating entities being au-
thenticated, and it also has to generate secure keys that would
be used for encrypting the communications. For this reason,
regardless of what type of AWN is chosen, it is necessary
to set up a secure channel (to enable secure communication),
which is the sole focus of this paper: our goal is to evaluate the
security and performance of different secure channel protocols.
We note that although wireless jamming and Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks are valid and real concerns for AWNs we do not
investigate them here and countermeasures to cope with such
attacks are beyond the scope of this paper.
IV. SECURE CHANNEL DEPLOYMENT SCENARIOS
In this section, we discuss the three deployment scenarios
that we have defined for the establishment of secure chan-
nels in AWNs. Even though these scenarios might not be
exhaustive, we believe that they are representative. Wireless
communication itself can be deployed either in Access Point
(AP) or ad-hoc modes. In this section, we are not concerned
with AP and/or ad-hoc modes but with the nature of the key
sharing mechanism, the supporting architecture, what is known
prior to the execution of the protocol, and the execution of the
secure channel protocols themselves. The issues of security
and reliability directly related to the AP and the AP/ad-hoc
modes are beyond the scope of this paper.
A. Pre-Shared Keys
In this scenario, all communicating nodes in an AWN share
a symmetric key that is provided either by their manufacturer
or by the entity that deploys/configures them. This pre-shared
key scenario can be achieved in two different ways. In the
first method all the nodes have the same key to encrypt all
the messages that they exchange with the other entities. In
the second method, the pre-shared key is not used to directly
encrypt the messages but to generate a session key. In this
scenario the pre-shared key is referred to as the “master key”
and a pre-defined algorithm is used to generate session keys.
B. Trusted Key Distribution Frameworks (TKDF)
In this scenario, all the nodes in the AWN trust a single
entity that is responsible for generating and distributing the
session keys that they will use to encrypt their messages.
Such an entity is referred as a Trusted Key Distribution Server
(TKDS) and all the nodes in the network have to communicate
with it. Since not all nodes of the AWN might be in wireless
communication range of the TKDS, they thus have to rely
on neighboring nodes or on wireless range extenders (relay
nodes). Each node in the AWN and the TKDS initially shares
a secret key (either a symmetric or asymmetric key) and these
keys are used to secure the communication between each of
the nodes and the TKDS.
C. Key Sharing On Demand
In this scenario, each individual node executes a secure
channel protocol with its communicating peers in the network.
The aim of this protocol is to authenticate the nodes with each
other and to create session keys. For this deployment scenario,
no prior sharing of keys is required as the session keys are
computed during the execution of the protocol. For entity au-
thentication, some prior knowledge of communicating partners
is essential. This is required to successfully authenticate the
entities. The process of authentication does not influence the
key generation/sharing process in a protocol.
V. ESTABLISHING SECURE WIRELESS CONNECTIONS
The performance of several secure channel protocols has
been measured over a wireless comm-link in a AWN test-bed.
The results are presented in this section.
A. Selected Protocols
Seven different protocols have been considered to establish
secure channels over the wireless comm-link of the AWN
test-bed. They can be gathered in three different families:
secure channels based on pre-shared keys; secure channels
based on Trusted Key Distribution Frameworks (TKDFs); and
secure channels based on key sharing protocols, as discussed
in section IV.
For secure channels based on pre-shared keys, Wired Equiv-
alent Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access Pre-Shared Key
(WPA-PSK) and IPSec have been selected. When using WEP,
each node has a fixed pre-shared key used to encrypt the data
frames using RC4. With WPA-PSK, each node has a pre-
shared master key that is used to build session keys during
the authentication phase. Compared to the two previous secure
channel protocols, IPSec encryption (with fixed pre-shared
keys in our experiments) is achieved at the level of layer 3
(i.e. network) of the OSI protocol stack instead of layer 2 (i.e.
data link) for WEP and WPA-PSK.
For secure channels based on TKDFs, two ad-hoc frame-
works were developed. The authentication and key distribution
phase is based on symmetric keys for the first framework
whereas it is based on asymmetric keys for the second frame-
work. In a symmetric key-based TKDF, each node shares a
symmetric key with a trusted key distribution server, which
uses it to send the session key encrypted with the shared key
associated with each communicating node. Then each node
decrypts it to use the key to finalize the establishment of
the secure channel. For our experiments, the fixed version
of the Needham-Schroeder Symmetric Key Protocol, which
is the basis of Kerberos, was implemented using AES as the
symmetric encryption algorithm.
In an asymmetric key-based TKDF, each node shares a
public key with a trusted key distribution server, which uses it
to send encrypted session keys that the target node deciphers
with its private key. For our experiments, the fixed version
of the Needham-Schroeder (so-called Needham-Schroeder–
Lowe) public Key Protocol was implemented using RSA as the
public key algorithm. In both TKDFs, the distributed session
keys are symmetric keys used by the parties to communicate
in the network. In our implementations, AES was used as the
channel encryption algorithm.
For the secure channels based on key sharing protocols,
SSH and SSL were selected.
B. Comparison Criteria
For a protocol to support the AWN framework, it should
meet, at minimum, the security and operational requirements
listed below:
G1) Mutual Entity Authentication: All nodes in the network
should be able to authenticate with each other so as to
avoid masquerading by a malicious entity.
G2) Asymmetric Architecture: Certified public keys should
be exchanged between the entities to facilitate the key
generation and entity authentication process.
G3) Mutual Key Agreement: Communicating parties should
agree on the generation of a key during the execution of
the protocol.
G4) Joint Key Control: Communicating parties should mu-
tually control the generation of new keys to prevent one
party from choosing weak keys or predetermining any
portion of the session key.
G5) Key Freshness: The generated key should be fresh with
regards to the protocol session to prevent replay attacks.
G6) Mutual Key Confirmation: The communicating parties
should provide implicit or explicit confirmation that they
have generated the same keys during a run of the protocol.
G7) Known-Key Security: Should a malicious user obtain
the session key of a particular protocol run, he/she should
not be able to retrieve long-term secrets (private keys) or
session keys (future and past).
G8) Unknown Key Share Resilience: In the event of an
unknown key share attack, an entity X believes that it
has shared a key with Y , where the entity Y mistakenly
believes that it has shared the key with entity Z 6= X .
The proposed protocols should adequately protect against
this kind of attack.
G9) Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resilience: If a
malicious user retrieves the long-term key of an entity Y ,
it will enable him to impersonate Y . Nevertheless, com-
promising the key should not enable him to impersonate
other entities [29].
G10) Perfect Forward Secrecy: If the long-term keys of com-
municating entities are compromised, this should not en-
able a malicious user to compromise previously generated
session keys.
G11) Mutual Non-Repudiation: The communicating entities
will not be able to deny that they have executed a protocol
run with each other.
G12) Partial Chosen Key (PCK) Attack Resilience: Proto-
cols that claim to provide joint key control are susceptible
to this type of attack [30]. In this type of attack, if two
entities provide separate values to the key generation
function then one entity has to communicate its con-
tribution value to the other. The second entity can then
compute the value of its contribution in such a way that it
can dictate its strength (i.e. it is able to generate a partially
weak key). This attack depends upon the computational
capabilities of the second entity. The proposed protocols
should adequately prevent PCK attack.
G13) Privacy: A third party should not be able to know the
identities of the AWN nodes.
For a formal definition of the (italicized) terms used in the
above list, the reader is referred to [31]. The requirements
listed above are used below as a point of reference to compare
the selected protocols in Table I.
For the performance evaluation that we have conducted,
the main measurements are related to the time required to
establish a secure channel once the wireless link is established
(or to establish the secure wireless link for protocols like WEP
and WPA-PSK operating at the level of the data link layer).
The properties of the keys (e.g. type of keys, key size, and
freshness) will be discussed with regards to the performance
results.
Backend platform for measurements
Server
Ethernet 
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Ethernet wire
Raspberry Pi equipped 
with a Wi-Fi USB dongle
Secure Channel Protocol
Avionics Wireless Network
Wi-Fi 
eavesdropping
Figure 4. AWN test-bed
C. Test-Bed for Performance Evaluation
In our AWN test-bed each node is a Raspberry Pi model
B supplied with a Wi-Fi USB dongle TL-WN722N by TP-
LINK. In all our measurements, the nodes were configured in
ad-hoc mode.
For all the selected protocols, in our evaluation implemen-
tations, only 2 nodes establish a secure channel. However, for
the TKDF, a key distribution server is also required and a third
node in the ad-hoc network plays this role.
In our AWN test-bed, each node is connected to a backend
server by means of an Ethernet connection. This server con-
trols the nodes so as to prepare them for the target scenario
and is also in charge of collecting the measurements. Effective
measurement can be done internally on the node initiating the
secure channel, called a client, or at the level of the network
data exchanged between the nodes of the AWN and captured
with a Wi-Fi card on the backend server set in monitor mode.
VI. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the security analysis of the
selected protocols based on the goals stated above; it is
followed by the performance analysis of these protocols. We
conclude the section with an overall analysis and with a
discussion of some future research directions.
A. Security Analysis
Before discussing the analysis of the security goals as met
by each protocol presented in Table I, it is worth noting that
several of them can be configured in several manners that may
change the way they satisfy the goals and may also change
their performance. For instance, we decided to use IPSec
with fixed pre-shared keys. This choice is not one that can
satisfy the maximum number of goals but this solution is more
suitable for resource-constrained wireless nodes. However,
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol could have been used
and then IPSec would have met additional goals.
When comparing the selected protocols, taking into account
the above remark, it is interesting to note that the protocols
based on asymmetric cryptosystems are those that meet most
of the goals. However, these solutions are known to be costly
in terms of time and resource consumption, as confirmed
by the performance measurements presented in the following
section. The secure channel protocols acting in the low level
layers of the OSI stack, like WEP, WPA-PSK (layer 2), or even
IPSec (layer 3), fail to satisfy several goals, which is surprising
because, usually, security solutions provided at low levels are
more generic; they might be expected to ensure better security
than solutions working at higher levels. Solutions at these
levels that establish more secure channels do exist (e.g. 802.1X
and RADIUS server at level 2, IPSec and PKI) but they are
not applicable to resource-constrained wireless nodes. Thus,
among our selected protocols, solutions that establish secure
channels at higher levels (SSH or SSL operate respectively
at levels 7 and 5-7) and/or that rely on a server (symmetric
and asymmetric TKDF) satisfy more goals. However these
solutions are too costly: either they are based on asymmetric
cryptosystems (which are costly in terms of resources) or they
need a server that is costly in terms of bandwidth, latency and
delay.
Table I
PROTOCOLS COMPARISON ON THE BASIS OF THE STATED GOALS (SEE
SECTION V-B.)
Goals ProtocolsWEP WPA-PSK IPSec Symmetric TKDF Asymmetric TKDF SSH SSL
G1. −∗ −∗ −∗ ∗ ∗ (∗) ∗
G2. × × × × ∗ ∗ ∗
G3. × −∗ × −∗ −∗ ∗ ∗
G4. × −∗ −∗ −∗ −∗ (∗) (∗)
G5. × ∗ × ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G6. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G7. × ∗ × ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G8. −∗ −∗ −∗ −∗ −∗ ∗ ∗
G9. × × ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G10. × × × ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G11. × × × × ∗ ∗ ∗
G12. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G13. −∗ −∗ −∗ (∗) (∗) (∗) (∗)
Note: ∗ means that the protocol meets the stated goal, (∗) shows that
the protocol meets the requirement in certain conditions, × shows that
the protocol cannot meet the stated goal and −∗ means that the protocol
(implicitly) meets the requirement, not because of the protocol messages but
because of the prior relationship between the communicating entities.
B. Performance Analysis
The practical results obtained on our AWN test-bed confirm
the theoretical analysis: asymmetric cryptosystems are costly
and solutions relying on a third party (TKDFs) are even
more costly. To be fair, it is important to note that we
implemented the two TKDF protocols ourselves whereas the
implementations of other tested protocols were done by groups
of professional developers. Thus our implementations may be
optimized, but not to the point where this would change the
results by a significant factor. In addition, it can be noted that
SSL and SSH operate over a TCP connection, which is more
time consuming for the establishment of communication than
our implementations of TKDF, which operate over UDP to
improve performance (at the expense of the reliability of the
connection).
The good performance of WEP and WPA-PSK are related
to the fact that the protocols are run by the dedicated hardware
and firmware of the Wi-Fi card - optimized for the execution
of these protocols. The good results for IPSec are also related
to the use of optimized hardware on the Wi-Fi card to execute
this protocol - as it is an important protocol for Internet
communication.
Table II
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF SELECTED SECURE CHANNEL
PROTOCOLS.
Protocol Key type Key size (bits) Establishment (ms)
WEP RC4 128 2.42
WPA AES 128 2.55
IPSec AES 256 2.67
Symmetric TKDF AES 256 5092.88
Asymmetric TKDF RSA 2048 14447.63
SSH RSA 2048 911.21
SSL RSA 2048 1310.93
Note that in WEP and WPA-PSK in ad-hoc mode, the packet
loss was very important, respectively around 50% and 70%.
WPA-PSK in AP mode needs the same time to establish the
secure channel but the rate of packet lost was only 20%. For
IPSec in ad-hoc mode, which encrypts at layer 3 over a plain
text channel at layer 2, the rate of packet loss was 0%. Thus,
as mentioned in the next section, the connection mode and
the layer at which the secure channel should be established
are parameters that should be studied in future work.
C. Overall Analysis and Future Research Directions
It appears that the selected protocols (all state-of-the-art in
computer science security) are too generic, i.e. not specifically
tailored for the target applications, or do not offer acceptable
performance. Therefore, as part of our future research, we are
currently experimenting with:
• A new secure and trusted channel protocol that meets
all the stated requirements, moving away from large API
(Application Programming Interface) based protocols like
SSL and IPSec that might introduce implementation-
related vulnerabilities.
• Security and reliability of AP and ad-hoc modes in
different AWN deployment contexts.
Additionally, we are exploring the following directions:
• Countering wireless jamming and DoS attacks.
• Secure execution on nodes using ARM TrustZone and
Intel SGX.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have discussed the nature of ADN and how
AWNs might provide a valid alternative to wired networks.
Any communication that uses a wireless medium has the
inherent issue that an attacker can easily access this physical
communication link. This can enable the attacker to eaves-
drop and/or modify the contents of messages. To avoid this,
secure channels are essential to encrypt all messages. For this
encryption to be secure and robust, the keys that are used
need to be not only secure but also to meet additional security
requirements. In this paper, we listed thirteen security goals
that we believe any secure channel protocol should meet.
Subsequently, we selected seven different secure channel pro-
tocols (representative examples from three different wireless
deployment scenarios). We developed a test-bed to evaluate
their performance. We then compared the seven selected
protocols in terms of security and performance.
There is no doubt that extensive work is still required before
an AWN can be deployed in an aircraft environment and there
are many challenges to overcome. However, in this paper we
provide security comparisons and experimental performance
data that we believe will be useful for someone wanting to
deploy an AWN to enable them to make an informed decision
about which features/protocols meet their unique environment
and requirements. This paper contributes to the work that
needs to be done to make AWNs a robust and secure proposal.
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